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Abstract In this paper I counter the formalistic rejection of musical meaning and the 
consequent dismissal of the analogy between music and language. Although musical 
formalists may concede that music can express emotions and offer sonic analogues 
of dynamic relations, they claim that, contrary to a linguistic meaning, which would 
imply the inter-subjectively sharable reference to contents, purported musical 
meaning is vague, private, and arbitrary. Hence, they argue, music has no semantics, 
and, consequently, is not like language.  
However, the formalist account of linguistic meaning overlooks the pragmatic view 
of linguistic meaning. According to such an approach, language is a kind of action 
and linguistic meaning is determined by the use of language in specific contexts. 
Drawing on pragmatics, I will suggest that musical meaning is structurally and 
interestingly analogous to linguistic meaning, understood in such a way. A pragmatic 
understanding of music as communication, which is also supported by philosophical 
and empirical research on musical power to embody personal traits, is all what we 
need for answering positively the question of musical meaning. Musical works and 
musical performances are, like speech acts, communicational actions that activate 
and determine the vague and undetermined meaning of music, originated by music 
power of representing dynamic and emotional relations. Music’s determined 
meaning is actualized in virtue of its “context of use” (accordingly to the cultural-
social conventions of practices), while, conversely, musical actions contribute 
meaning to its context(s).  
Generally speaking, musical meaning emerges through contextual relations and 
interpretational acts. In this regard, focusing on the reciprocal connection between 
group improvisation and conversation, I will finally provide an emergentist and non-
intentionalist account of the pragmatic generation of musical meaning, which may be 
heuristically adopted also as paradigm of a conversational view of the interpretation 
of artworks. 
Keywords: philosophy of music, musical meaning, pragmatics, improvisation, 
emergentism 
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To Peter Kivy. 
In memoriam 
 
0. Introduction 
In this paper I counter the formalistic rejection of musical meaning and the 
consequent dismissal of the analogy between music and language. Although musical 
formalists may concede that music can express emotions and offer sonic analogues 
of dynamic relations, they claim that, contrary to a linguistic meaning, which would 
imply the inter-subjectively sharable reference to contents, purported musical 
meaning is vague, private, and arbitrary. Hence, they argue, music has no semantics, 
and, consequently, is not like language.  
However, the formalist account of linguistic meaning overlooks the pragmatic view 
of linguistic meaning. According to such an approach, language is a kind of action 
and linguistic meaning is determined by the use of language in specific contexts. 
Drawing on pragmatics, I will suggest that musical meaning is structurally and 
interestingly analogous to linguistic meaning, understood in such a way. A pragmatic 
understanding of music as communication, which is also supported by philosophical 
and empirical research on musical power to embody personal traits, is all what we 
need for answering positively the question of musical meaning. Musical works and 
musical performances are, like speech acts, communicational actions that activate 
and determine the vague and undetermined meaning of music, originated by music 
power of representing dynamic and emotional relations. Music’s determined 
meaning is actualized in virtue of its “context of use” (accordingly to the cultural-
social conventions of practices), while, conversely, musical actions contribute 
meaning to its context(s).  
Generally speaking, musical meaning emerges through contextual relations and 
interpretational acts. In this regard, focusing on the reciprocal connection between 
group improvisation and conversation, I will finally provide an emergentist and non-
intentionalist account of the pragmatic generation of musical meaning, which may be 
heuristically adopted also as paradigm of a conversational view of the interpretation 
of artworks. 
 
 
1. The Problem of Musical Meaning 
 
1.1. The Formalist Stance 
There are structural similarities between music and language1, especially because 
both linguistic and musical events take place over time through sequential 
connections of acoustic elements and share the possibility of codification. Music is 
usually conceived of (metaphorically) as a language and, in particular, a language of 
sentiments. Conversely, language can be understood in musical terms and 
«presupposes musical sensitivities» (HIGGINS 2012: 87), as evidenced by the 
                                                          
* I wish to thank Andrew Huddleston for carefully revising the English text of the article and offering 
precious comments. This research has been possible thanks to the financial support from the research 
project FFI 2015–64271–P, “Aesthetic experience of the arts and the complexity of perception”, of the 
Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. 
1 See BLACKING 1974, JACKENDOFF, LEHRDAL 1983, SLOBODA 1985, RAFFMAN 1993, 
BESSON 1999, BESSON, SCHÖN 2003, SACKS 2007, HIGGINS 2012, BERTINETTO 2017. 
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exemplary case of poetry (see LIPPMAN 1999, EMONS 2011). Moreover, 
philosophical and scientific theories defend their common evolutionary origin2. 
However, the view of music as language has been challenged with strong objections. 
The key one is surely that music cannot refer to and denote, as language does, things 
and concepts 3 . The articulation of some musical elements is analogous to 
grammatical structures and the formal elements of music may be conceived of in 
terms of syntax (or «quasi-syntax»: cf. RAFFMAN 1993: 434), but music has no 
semantics in a linguistic sense. Attempts, like Cooke’s (COOKE 1959), to set up a 
musical dictionary, a one-to-one referential system between harmonic and melodic 
elements and emotional meanings, failed miserably. Hence, formalists maintain, 
although «music so often gives the strong impression of being meaningful», «it isn’t 
about anything» (RAFFMAN 1993: 43, 41, cf. LERDAHL, JACKENDOFF 1983: 5-
6).  
As Peter Kivy, following Eduard Hanslick (HANSLICK 1986), notably argued, 
music does not refer to things and concepts, as language does; it cannot say anything 
regarding anything (KIVY 1990, 2002). The information music may convey is 
structural and intra-musical or intrinsic (see MEYER 1956, NATTIEZ 1976, 
GREEN 2005, KOOPMAN, DAVIES 2001), because it concerns exclusively the 
articulation of musical dynamic structures in relation to listeners’ expectations 
accordingly to the operational rules valid in given cultural contexts. You may want to 
call it “meaning”, but it is very different from the referential meaning words and 
propositions are endowed with. Hence, the formalist conclusion: music’s value does 
not depend on an alleged capacity to convey meaningful messages, but in its playful 
sonic forms. 
 
1.2. Against Musical Formalism 
Formalists highlight the differences between music and language, and rightly so. The 
similarities and the analogies between music and language notwithstanding, they are 
different. Music lacks the referential power of language. So, when, longer than 10 
years ago, I was preparing my Italian translation of Peter Kivy’s Introduction to a 
philosophy of music, I found his arguments clear and reasonable. Kivy had good 
points, indeed.  
However, despite how compelling Kivy’s ideas sounded to me, I was not completely 
satisfied by his radical rejection of the idea of musical meaning. The fact that music 
does not refer, as language does, to things and concepts, does this really entail that 
music has no meaning? 
A first doubt toward the formalist stance is this: the refusal of musical meaning 
seems to underestimate that music is the art of sounds. And it is fairly plausible to 
claim that art is a practice by means of which people take stances toward the natural 
and historical-social world as well as toward human life (see BERTRAM 2014). The 
experience of art involves sensory enjoyment, but stimulates also our cognitive 
                                                          
2 ROUSSEAU 1993, DARWIN 1981, SPENCER 1857, MOLINO 2000, BROWN 2000, MITHEN 
2005, CROSS, MORLEY 2009. 
3 Further objections are that that (instrumental) music is not a language, because (1) music is repetitive 
in a way language is not and because (2) music cannot be translated the same way, for example, an 
English utterance can be translated into an Italian or a Chinese one. See KIVY 1990, KIVY 2002. 
4  Conversely, Stephen Davies thinks that music has not syntax, because it is not a language. 
Nonetheless, he claims, it «might possess meaning in the sense that it presents a content that invites 
understanding» (DAVIES 1994: 24). 
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capacities: it demands understanding and requires consideration of cultural contexts 
and practices. This understanding articulates itself through production and circulation 
of meaning(s)5. Therefore, while sounds may have no meaning (as it certainly also 
may have, for example by working as signal, as alarm clocks’ sounds do), music 
seems to differ from other sound events in that sounds are not meaningful, per se, 
while music, as art, organizes sounds in ways that, especially due to music’s 
expressive power, are meaningful. Which is to say: when sounds are not heard and 
understood as meaningful, they are not music6. 
Formalists may insist further that sounds, per se, carry no meaning. So instrumental 
music, which does not use words, but only sounds, is not meaningful as, for instance, 
literature is (see KIVY 1997, KIVY 2009). Instrumental music is not a meaningful 
art, because, differently from words, simple sounds convey no messages. Music is 
sonic wallpaper: surely it is art, but a decorative one.  
Many scholars resist, however, the idea that musical sounds convey no message and 
consider the formalist rejection of musical meaning as not convincing. Letting aside 
the obvious observation that simple sounds often have referential functions in certain 
practical contexts (as in the case of the ambulance siren or the school bell), sounds 
may have a motivational power. Environmental sounds (are perceived both by 
human beings and animals as signals providing information by means of indicating 
the presence of environmental sound sources (which, for example, may be 
threatening or attractive) and they may be used for regulating the behavior of human 
beings and animals (cf. CROSS 2008). For example, rapid sequences of loud sounds 
with high pitches signal that an energized sender is nearby, arousing (say) fear and 
inducing the hearer to run away. So sounds are perceived as specifying their sources 
(see CLARKE 2005), thereby influencing human behavior.  
As a matter of fact, human beings take usually advantage of the natural, 
evolutionarily-wired power of sounds to induce behavioral reactions. Recently, 
scientific research has been devoted to explain music’s affective contagious powers7, 
i.e. its capacity to arouse emotions and affects besides conscious attention, and 
musical entrainment (CROSS 2005, CROSS, MORLEY 2009, CHAUVIGNÉ  et al. 
2014), that is, the power of pulse and rhythm to synchronize listeners’ movements, 
generating group behavior and reinforcing the compactness of social links (like in 
dance, march and other group activities). 
More importantly, human beings engage in the activity of organizing non-linguistic 
sounds for communicating with each other. Empirical work has recently been 
directed to understand the «communicative musicality», i.e. the role played by 
natural human musical capacities to create and sustain social relationships, beginning 
with the interactions between newborns and caregivers, which occur thanks to the 
reciprocal manifestation of what Daniel Stern called «vital forms»: the dynamic 
gestalts of gestures and vocalizes through which proto-musical dialogues take place 
(MALLOCH, TREVARTHEN 2009, GRATIER, APTER-DANON 2009, STERN 
2010, MEINI 2015). 
Therefore, also musical sounds may have meaning in virtue of natural-environmental 
associations and may also be used for communicating. The communicative power of 
                                                          
5 This idea is elaborated by MCFEE 1997. 
6 Different perspectives on this point are elaborated, for example, by ARBO 2013 and KRAMER 
2011. 
7 See DAVIES 2011a. The social dimension of musical contagion is explored by DENORA 2000. 
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music seems to be proved by the way in which musical abilities and resources are 
articulated and used in everyday situations for providing information, shaping 
emotions, and coordinating social interaction (BROWN 2000, MITHEN 2005, 
DISSANAYAKE 2009, CROSS, MORLEY 2009, PANKSEPP, TREVARTHEN 
2009). All this indicates that music is, like language, a “communication tool” (cf. 
IMBERTY 2000). The way we use language in a discourse or a conversation for 
communicating is interestingly analogous to musical communication — that is, to 
how human beings communicate through music. As Jean-Julien Aucouturier and 
Clément Canonne suggest, there is empirical data confirming that «music is a 
paradigmatically social activity which, as such, involves not only the outward 
expression of individual mental states, but also direct communication acts through 
the intentional use of musical sounds» (AUCOUTURIER, CANONNE 2017: 106). 
It seems that the possibility to hear music as meaningful is partly due precisely to its 
capacity to generate relationships, induce or promote social interactions and 
communicate. This is clear in all musical practices requiring active co-participation, 
that show that music is a powerful medium for exercising shared intentionality and 
interactional abilities8 , which arguably are preconditions for the structuration of 
symbolic systems (cf. TOMASELLO 1999, TOMASELLO 2008). Yet, even in the 
“contemplative” listening, which is typical for the Western experience of music in 
the concert hall, music communicational power is fostered (at least implicitly) by 
music’s link to emotions and feelings, which is one of the main sources of the 
aesthetic pleasure of music listening9 . The musical flow engenders processes of 
expectation and anticipation (MEYER 1956, HURON 2006, NEGRETTO 2010), 
presenting sonic images of movement and energy as well as expressing and arousing 
emotions, thereby showing traces of human behavior.  
The defense of musical meaning against the formalist attack has usually been based 
especially on music’s capacity to sonically portray and induce dynamic processes 
and on its (natural, social, and subjective) relation with emotions. In spite of not 
referring to things and concepts by denotation, as language does, music presents, 
through sonic exemplification, the dynamics of the emotional life, thereby connoting 
concepts and events of the world 10 . Listeners can indeed perceive music as 
meaningful, and music has a semantic dimension or, at least, a «quasi-semantics» 
(RAFFMAN 1993: 41), because sounds and their (simultaneous or subsequent) 
combinations are heard as possessing and indicating features of dynamic processes 
                                                          
8 Different cognitive perspectives on musical joint action are elaborated by KELLER 2008 and by 
SCHIAVIO, HØFFDING 2015. 
9 For a survey of the philosophical debate on music and emotions see BERTINETTO 2017: 149-230. 
For the psychological research on the topic see JUSLIN, SLOBODA 2010. 
10 In order to precise in which sense music can convey meaning, Ian Cross suggested to applying to 
music Peirce’s classification of signs in icons, indexes and symbols (PEIRCE 1965; see CROSS 2008: 
158). It is a useful suggestion. Briefly, an icon represents in virtue of formal similarity to what it 
stands for (hence portraits are exemplarily icons); an index signifies a referent because it is factually 
(causally or conventionally) correlated to it and this correlation is recognized thanks to prior 
association (the typical example being the weathercock); finally, symbols are signs that, like words of 
a natural language, are embedded in a formal system and are conventionally related to referents. It can 
be argued, that musical sounds convey meaning when they work as icons (sonically portraying 
something or someone) and indexes (like the musical themes indicating the characters of Prokoviev’s 
musical poem Peter and the Wolf, 1936). However, due to the social and personal sources of musical 
meanings, in particular contexts musical sounds may also mean as symbols. 
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and relations, thereby (at least metaphorically) exemplifying them11. Thanks to its 
melodic, harmonic, rhythmic, and other tonal features (intonation, time changes, 
thematic contrasts, and timbre combinations), music produces, through patterned 
sounds, sonic analogs of dynamic processes linked to human experience12: spatial 
movements (ascent, descent, expansion, contraction…), emotional states and 
processes (joy, obsession, melancholy…), bodily gestures, and actions 
(ZBIKOWSKI 200913)14. 
In particular, we perceive a musical gesture when we interpret a musical passage as 
marked by a (mostly expressive) intentionality, i.e. as significant, and when its 
meaning is emergent, in that it is more than the sum of its components (HATTEN 
2006). Like gestures of bodily language, musical gestures are understood as 
embodying affective, emotional and cognitive contents (related in particular to social 
modes of belonging) that affords behavioral responses, inviting to interaction (cf. 
KÜHL 2011). In the case of a contemplative listening this interaction is usually 
offline: it is imaginative and interpretative. Nonetheless, since listeners react 
emotionally to actions and emotions sonically presented and expressed by music, 
listening to music is an exercise in sociability. Music’s dynamic features specify 
processes we usually attribute to living beings we interact with. So it is plausible that 
we hear music as expressive and meaningful, when we recognize in music’s dynamic 
features personal traits, i.e. when we hear it as sonically evoking living beings that 
move, act, interact, express themselves, and communicate with each other and with 
listeners. 
I take this to be the core idea of the so called theory of the musical persona endorsed 
by philosophers (see in particular LEVINSON 2006, ROBINSON 2005, RINDERLE 
2010), musicologists (HATTEN 2010, MONAHAN 2013), anthropologists 
(BLACKING 1973), and psychologists (WATT, ASH 1998, TOLBERT 2001, 
BRANDT 2009), who defend, with experimental support, that «we hear music as the 
socially meaningful presence of another person» (TOLBERT 2001: 86), a «virtual 
person» (WATT, ASH 1998: 49). Hence, also when we do not participate to musical 
events while literally moving or otherwise interacting with musicians and other 
                                                          
11 See GOODMAN 1968 for the notion of exemplification. La Matina (2006) interestingly adopts it 
for explaining musical meaning. 
12 Susanne Langer (LANGER 1942, see DAVIES 1994: 123-134) is credited with the idea that music 
is able to iconically present emotions through sounds: it presents emotions not by discursively relating 
to them, but representing their kinetic characteristics. Although Langer’s view has been much 
discussed and criticized, it seems nonetheless plausible to accept that music has a capacity to sonically 
present movement, thereby offering a sonic representation of the emotional life, which seems to be 
empirically supported by recent psychological research (cf. JUSLIN, SLOBODA 2010, MEINI 2015). 
13 Unlike linguistic signs, which can be replaced by others to refer to objects, and like expressive 
gestures of the body, musical gestures cannot be arbitrarily replaced by other gestures: they are part of 
what they express. 
14 Probably due to music’s power to present dynamic processes through articulated sounds, Mary 
Higgins (2012: 79) claims that «music has affinity with a particular part of speech, specifically the 
preposition. Sequences of music have directionality, and the various ways this directionality proceeds 
might be described in terms of prepositions (above, beyond, during, etc.).» However, she adds, 
«[e]ven if music might be compared to a language of prepositions, this would be a language in a very 
strange sense. A language with only one part of speech is unlike the languages people speak». I do not 
find this suggestion particularly convincing. I do not hear music in terms of prepositions, though I 
may understand the communicational power of music, hearing it in terms of phrases, discourses or 
conversations. 
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listeners, the communicational interaction being here a virtual, rather than an actual, 
one, the musical experience is an exercise in social participation and communication. 
All this restores the idea of musical meaning: music evokes things and concepts, not 
only because articulated sounds can onomatopoeically reproduce the sounds 
produced by things and living beings, but because it presents iconically emotions and 
patterns of movement, evoking objects, situations, events, or living beings (and their 
relations) by means of representing their acoustic or kinetic features, also in virtue of 
cultural and contextual associations implemented indexically (see KARBUSICKY 
1986, CROSS 2008, RAFFMAN 1993). Moreover, since music extends temporally, 
musical development may be interpreted as a narrative (cf. MAUS 1997, 
LEVINSON 2006). 
 
1.3. The Indeterminacy of Musical Meaning 
Formalists are not satisfied with the mentioned attempts of explaining how music 
may have meaning (see, paradigmatically, KIVY 1990, KIVY 2002). Even granted 
that music may, in the one or the other way, arouse and express emotions and 
iconically presents movement, the defense of musical meaning fails, because, 
formalists insist, the power of music to refer to persons, objects, and events is very 
poor. The alleged “meaning” of musical sonic representations is too vague and 
abstract and, differently from linguistic symbols, musical symbols are arbitrary and 
idiosyncratic. Music does not possess meaning as resulting from intentional 
stipulation in a symbolic system, like in natural languages. Musical meaning (as 
argued by DAVIES 1994: 29-49) might be at best the result of a deliberate 
stipulation of reference in isolated and not-generalizable occurrences15. This is the 
reason why, for example, reading together the notes, in the German designation, of 
the subject of the last fugue of the Art of the fugue (B-A-C-H) listeners can discover 
the composer’s signature. 
But, as precisely this famous example shows, music, formalists will want to 
maintain, has meaning only thanks to stipulative associations and, in particular, in 
virtue of specification provided by other media, especially language and visual 
images. The fact that musical patterns may associatively get an indexical value, 
thereby referring indicatively to things and persons16, when they are combined with 
words and images, scores no points for the defense of musical meaning. It rather 
proves that music alone is not meaningful. So, when we attach meaning to a musical 
piece, this is due to extra-musical reasons and, especially, to our personal experience. 
For instance, lovers may find a particular meaning in a musical piece. The song may 
signify (for them) the beginning of (their) romantic love: however, this meaning is 
private, in that it is not generally valid. Others may understand the piece differently, 
without linking it to a personal experience of love. Hence, the meaning is not of the 
music, but it is simply projected on it, the same way we may project meaning to 
objects in virtue of their association with our subjective experiences17. 
At this point also non-formalists just have to bite the bullets and admit the 
indeterminacy of musical meaning. Music “aboutness” is «floating», i.e. not fixed 
                                                          
15  Yet, Davies things, speaking of musical meaning in this sense does not offer a reason for 
understanding music as language. 
16 There are legions of examples. You can think at the famous notes indicating the shark in Steven 
Spielberg’s movie Jaw (1975) or at the leitmotiv indicating Siegfried in Wagner’s Ring. 
17 In the philosophical literature, this case is known as the our song phenomenon. 
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and unequivocally determined (see CROSS 2005, CROSS 2008, CROSS, MORLEY 
2009). As defended by Leonard Meyer (1956: 70), music presents, by means of 
exemplifying its properties, a generic content, a «connotative complex». Hence, at 
this regard the formalist view is right: the referential capacity of music is vague and 
that attribution of meaning to music is a cultural, often a personal, affair. But is this a 
sufficient reason for justifying the strong eliminativist conclusion that music has no 
meaning? 
Like other supporters of the thesis that music has (or may have) meaning, I argue that 
this claim is not justified, because the formalist objection against musical meaning 
seems to presuppose a semanticist view of meaning, which ignores the pragmatic 
dimension of language. I will elaborate on this view in the next section. 
 
 
2. Sound Pragmatics 
 
2.1. Pragmatics and Musical Meaning 
Musical formalists think that linguistic meaning is determined and inter-subjectively 
sharable and that the reason why language is a communicational tool is that it is able 
to convey detailed information in a clear referential way. However, as Ridley (2004) 
pointed out, this view is based upon a semanticist conception according to which 
linguistic meaning is independent from the experiential, pragmatic, and cultural 
context it is inserted within. But pragmatic considerations of contexts of use seem to 
be required for specifying the specific content of an utterance. There is more than 
structure and denotation to language and the sense of what is communicated is 
determined contextually: it is evinced by interpretation in reference to contextual 
information (and, in particular, from what Paul Grice called «conversational 
implicatures»; cf. GRICE 1975)18. Moreover language is also a tool for performing 
effects in the world: speaking is acting (AUSTIN 1962, SEARLE 1969). We use 
language not only for representing objects and concepts but also in illocutionary 
ways, i.e. for intervening in the world, performing actions through the utterance 
(promising, questioning, confessing, menacing…), as well as in perlocutionary ways, 
i.e. for manipulating other people, thereby changing the context in which we act as 
speakers. 
The consideration of pragmatics may considerably shorten the distance between 
music and language regarding the question of meaning19. On the one hand, music is, 
like language, a tool through which we communicate and we (inter-)act in the world. 
On the other hand, although musical meaning is often vague and subjective, it can, 
like semantic linguistic meaning, be contextually and pragmatically determined and 
                                                          
18 To put it simply, in order to understand what a speaker explicitly says, listeners must grasp what is 
implicated in her utterance. Hence, conversational implicatures are the pragmatic implications of 
speech acts. They are sentences that can be communicated in an utterance, and inferentially grasped, 
without being explicitly said, in virtue of some rules of conversational behavior. In other words, they 
are «inferences based on both the content of what has been said and some specific assumptions about 
the co-operative nature of ordinary verbal interaction» (LEVINSON 1983: 104, cf. RECANATI 2004: 
80, BIANCHI 2006: 73). 
19  Interestingly, for the present discussion, is that also the prosodic features of speech, such as 
intonation, are to be considered as part of linguistic pragmatics. The musicality of language is an 
important dimension of its communicational functions, since it allows to specifying the illocutionary 
and perlocutionary meaning of an utterance (cf. MITHEN 2005, BRANDT 2009, HAUSEN et al. 
2013). 
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inter-subjectively shared. So, in this sense, musical and linguistic meaning are 
interestingly analogous. 
Abstractly considered, the floating meaning of music is only potential, because of the 
indeterminacy of its aboutness. However, this potential meaning is actualized and 
determined pragmatically and contextually (see COOK 2001), i.e. through the 
particular use of the «connotative complex» evoked by music. It goes without saying 
that the precision with which the meaning of a linguistic utterance may be specified 
with reference to an object is higher than the referential precision of music: but also 
linguistic meaning is, although to a minor degree, undetermined and “floating” and is 
“fixed” pragmatically, thanks to contextual specifications. 
Music is (differently) meaningful in the context of (different) experiences, uses and 
practices 20 . The meaning of musical gestures is, for instance, based on cultural 
conventions, like the meaning of bodily gestures: abstracted from contexts, it is only 
potential and vague and it needs a context for being actualized and determined. The 
interpretation of sounds as gestures as well as the related understanding of its 
(expressive and connotative) meaning requires (the knowledge of) the context in 
which the gesture takes place. Otherwise listeners can hardly understand the 
gesture’s meaning. The point may be easily generalized. The semantic meaning of 
music is vague. It is actualized and determined contextually, i.e. pragmatically. It is 
“gathered” from the context in which music occurs and/or is experientially related to, 
while at the same time music contributes meaning to it (cf. CROSS, MORLEY 2009: 
68). 
 
2.2. Musical Pragmatics  
In the previous sections I claimed that the potential, floating and ambiguous meaning 
of music, which is due to its power to sonically portray dynamic relations and 
emotions, is activated, determined, and specified contextually and pragmatically. 
This determining and activating specification, I will now defend, may be provided in 
different ways: by different subjects – a) composers, b) performers, c) listeners, d) 
critics – as well by other factors and, in particular, other media music may be joined 
with e). 
a) Musical works may be understood as communicational actions accomplished 
by composers who may specify in different ways the meaning conveyed by music. 
For example, they may add a title or a program to their compositions, or simply 
publically declaring what their music is about, thereby generating contextual 
information that will restrict the interpretational range for understanding the content 
of the musical communication. So, for instance, the descriptive program of Ottorino 
Respighi’s Le fontane di Roma (1916) guides the interpretation of the meaning of the 
music: especially listeners who know the particular features of the four of Rome’s 
fountains musically depicted by Respighi may grasp the precise sound references to 
each of them. In particular, works composed for special occasions – such as masses, 
or other kinds of celebrations – specify their own referential context and show 
through their expressive musical features the communicational aims of composers, 
so that later performances may convey the composer’s message also by using the 
music in other circumstances (for example, performing Missa in tempore belli, 
composed by Haydn in 1796 at the time of the Napoleonic Wars, during World War 
                                                          
20 Moreover the idiosyncratic quality of musical meaning may be a specific property of music, which 
per se does not rule out its meaningfulness (see HIGGINS 1997 and below § 2.2. c)). 
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II21).  
More generally, musical sequences set in place contextual implications that generate 
expectations in listeners, accordingly to the cultural conventions of a musical 
practice. Composers rely on those cultural conventions supposedly shared by the 
potential audience of the work22. So, as in linguistic communication, the success of a 
musical work largely depends on listeners’ knowledge of those conventions and, in 
general, of the historical context of the composition. At this regard Grice’s 
conception of the pragmatic preconditions for a good communication are applicable 
to music. According to him (GRICE 1975, cf. BIANCHI 2006, SPERBER, WILSON 
1986) linguistic communication is ideally based on maxims of cooperation (such as 
“give the right amount of information”, “avoid false information”, “be relevant”, “be 
perspicuous”, “follow turn-taking rules”, etc.) speakers resort to in order to show 
their communicative intentions. Analogous maxims regulate musical communication 
and composers may use them in various ways, even when they violate them. For 
example, by disregarding syntactical conventions valid in a specific cultural context, 
composers may play with listeners’ expectations, with the intentional aim of 
generating emotional and humoristic effects (surprise, excitement, exhilaration, etc.), 
thereby producing musical meaning. 
It is for example the case of Joseph Haydn’s String Quartet in Eb op. 33 n. 2, largely 
discussed by London (1996). This piece is known as The Joke. The title is justified, 
because its last movement ends abruptly with a phrase previously used for the 
beginning of the melodic articulation. This musical gesture has the intended 
performative effect of making listeners smile. Surprised by the structural strangeness 
of the piece, listeners can get the composer’s joke and sympathize with him, 
understanding his musical move as funny, if they recognize the pragmatic 
implication of his “utterance”, i.e. if they grasp what he intentionally communicates 
by means of flouting shared structural musical conventions (cf. RECANATI 2004: 
70, BIANCHI 2006: 64-70). Hence, following London (1996), it can be argued that 
instrumental music can exercise at least communicational acts analogous to speech 
acts such as apologizing, commending, condoling, congratulating, etc., that have to 
do with social behavior, attitudes, habits, and the expressions of feelings (Austin 
labeled them behabitive). They do not necessarily require propositional content, are 
performed in the present tense (or without relation to verbal tense), do not require a 
specific institutional role for the speaker, and are marked by paralinguistic and 
“musical” features such as intonation. Generally speaking, as London writes (2008: 
262), «a conversational analysis may well be warranted for any piece of music that is 
expressive and gives rise to an affective response»23. 
b) Pragmatic and conversational analysis works especially well for musical 
performances that, as such, are properly to be understood as communicative actions. 
Performances of musical works may help composers to fulfill their communicative 
intentions, by means of conveying their message to the audience. Since music is a 
performing art, and performance (or playback) is the unavoidable medium for 
                                                          
21 The example is LONDON’s 2008: 261. 
22 See LEWIS 2002 for a classical study on conventions as behavioral regularities that, in virtue of 
common knowledge, and shared preferences, solve practical coordination problems. 
23 In virtue of the similitude between musical structure and phonological Gestalt of linguistic speech 
acts, wordless music may also suggest other kinds of communicational acts the same way we may 
understand the speech act performed even when we cannot understand the foreign language in which 
the communication occurs. 
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hearing a composition, the social setting and the performing context of music are 
particularly relevant for specifying musical meaning. The relation between 
composition and performance is analogous to the one between a sentence (as type) 
and the performance of uttering it (as token of the sentence). Letting aside 
ontological considerations24, the point is that the same way the actual meaning of a 
linguistic sentence is specified pragmatically, in the context of its use in the act of 
uttering it, the meaning of a composition is specified pragmatically, in the context of 
its use in the act of performing it. The “floating” musical meaning of a composition 
is determined by interpreters’ renditions in (relation to) particular contexts.  
Not only that. While interpreting a musical piece (for example by playing it in a 
particular expressive way), performers not only have to adapt it to the performance 
situation, but also, in some sense, appropriate the piece. So the way they convey a 
composer’s musical message may transform it to different degree. It is like the 
performance of a theatrical piece. As ancient pieces are interpretively adapted to the 
present time of their performance, musical performances are interpretive adaptations 
that generate meaning (more or less) in reference to the performance historical and 
social context (see HAMILTON 2007; for a discussion see DAVIES 2011b: 113-
120).  
Obviously, musical interpretations may sound wrong: for example, instead of 
communicating the expressive qualities of the piece, it violates its expressive 
features, resulting in something false and/or nonsensical. In the same way, the use of 
an utterance may simply fail to make sense, instead of generating meaning. Yet both 
linguistic and musical violations may also be creative of new meanings. 
Linguistically, this is particularly evident in poetry. In music, this is particularly 
evident in those cases when the performance explicitly alters the way a composition 
is commonly understood, while appropriating the piece in a different context. In the 
literature about Afro-American culture this practice of appropriation is interestingly 
known as signifyin’ (cf. GATES 1989), meaning that musicians “converse” with an 
inherited musical material that is recaptured, in a mixed attitude of complicity and 
distancing, through reverential quotations or, conversely, by irreverent gestures of 
irony, parody, sarcasm, or open criticism. Here are some examples.  
Sidney Bechet signifies on George Gershwin’s composition Summertime (from 
Porgy and Bess, 1935) in the version performed for a Blue Note 78 record in June 
1939. Here, after the statement of Summertime’s theme, Bechet quotes the Miserere 
from Giuseppe Verdi’s Trovatore, announcing the hanging of Leonora’s lover. Porgy 
and Bess is «a controversial opera unrealistically depicting black life in the slums of 
a Southern town» (MARTINELLI 2009: 4). By adding Verdi’s bitter aria to 
Gershwin’s idyllic song, «Bechet is not only taking advantage of musical 
similarities, fitting the familiar Trovatore melody on the Summertime chords, but 
also covertly expressing, like the black performers in the choir of Gershwin's opera, a 
direct and severe criticism to it» (Ivi: 5). 
John Coltrane’s famous version of My Favorite Things offers another interesting 
case. Coltrane’s rendition (1960) of the Broadway Waltz (1959) does not only 
change the formal structure of the song, but transforms radically its expressivity. In 
1960 the escalation in the Civil Rights movement was strong and Coltrane was aware 
of the kitsch insistence on white things in the song’s text («girls in white dresses», 
                                                          
24 The type/token distinction (a terminology introduced by Charles Sanders Pierce) offers one of the 
most discussed model of musical ontology, which I critically discussed in BERTINETTO 2012 and 
BERTINETTO 2016a. 
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«cream-colored ponies», «snowflakes on eyelashes», «silver white winters»). His 
way of playing shows irony about the cultural connotations of the original song 
(MONSON 1996: 98-123). 
Another example comes from rock music: Jimmy Hendrix’s performance of the 
American national Anthem at Woodstock (1969). Here Hendrix appropriated the 
musical piece (based on a precedent English song), re-contextualizing its meaning 
through sound pragmatic references to the Vietnam war, that was going on at that 
time. Through pragmatic implications, listeners present at the performance could 
understand the musical message: when the music sonically depicted the dropping of 
bombs, they did not think at the British bombing Fort McHenry in 1814, but at 
Americans bombing Vietnam in 1969. The social and political meaning of the 
performance is generated pragmatically, and this does not necessarily need the 
reference to texts, as strict formalists may object in relation to the presented cases of 
song performances. Theodor Gracyk writes at this regard:  
 
Hendrix’s arrangement of the music introduces musical material for pragmatic 
interpretation without relying on audience knowledge of an associated English 
text. […] Independent of words, musical details contribute to a performance's 
pragmatic content through both conventional and unconventional implicature 
(for example, […] the “pictured” bombs […]). 
[…] Hendrix's Woodstock performance stands to the song as an utterance of a 
sentence stands to that sentence. Hence, he could exploit the cultural context of 
1969 in order to generate pragmatic implications that are not part of the musical 
work (GRACYK 2013: 28). 
 
So, a musical piece may be used (and abused) by performances for reasons others 
than conveying truthfully the (alleged) composers’ musical meaning. Thereby, new 
musical meaning is pragmatically generated. Often by means of relying on the 
expressive features of the piece and on the musical education and tastes of receivers, 
a pragmatic meaning is produced which may have very little relation with the 
original connotations and the cultural context of the composition. Mozart’s music 
may be used for entertaining passengers of an elevator or as soundtrack of a 
commercial. Nicholas Cook elaborates at this regards on the way the «energetic and 
expressive attributes» (power, verve and grace) of the Marriage of Figaro overture 
(1786) are transferred to a French car, «endowing it with connotations of prestige 
and of high culture […]. The music, so to speak, seeks out the qualities of the car, 
and conversely the image of the speeding [car] might be said to interpret the music» 
(COOK 2001: 180), generating a composite, multimediatic meaning (see below e)). 
But Mozart may also be (ab-)used for annoying young boys in a parking lot, thereby 
making them going away25. Analogously, a Chopin’s piece, a Nirvana’s song or a 
specific interpretation of a jazz standard performed by Miles Davis may be played 
back, in given situations and dependently from the addressed person, as valentines, 
i.e. to say “I love you” to somebody and to request a desired sentimental response 
(cf. LONDON 2008). 
To sum up, a composition may be performed in ways such to provide it with 
connotations not possibly foreseen by composers, especially by means of referring to 
the occasion and the social-historical context of the performance and of using it for 
conveying messages to specific listeners. 
                                                          
25 The example is discussed by LONDON 2008. 
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c) Listeners’ personal experience is actually key for evincing meanings from 
musical events. Even though the meaning specification of the context is weak, as it 
happens in the case of linguistic meaning, listeners’ personal experience impacts on 
their understanding of the music. A theoretical suggestion offered by Kendall Walton 
is useful at this regard (WALTON 1988, WALTON 1994). According to him, the 
meaning suggested by music is of a general nature. Music indicates a concept 
without exactly representing specific cases. It can suggest the idea of patience, 
ascension, struggle, return, etc., without referring to particular cases of patience, 
ascent, struggle, return, etc. At this regard, musical meaning is, as we have seen, 
ambiguous, vague, and floating. A musical passage, for instance, can not be related 
to the war of Troy or to war in general, but to “struggle”, a general concept 
encompassing different kinds and experiences of struggle: political and military 
struggles, the struggle against poverty, the conflict between personal desire and 
prudent judgment, etc. As just explained, the context (a title, a text, a particular 
interpretation offered by performers, etc.) may specify the meaning indicated by the 
musical passage, offering information supporting one or the other interpretation (for 
example: a certain history or a specific experience), thereby activating and 
determining the meaning of music. 
However, it may be the case that contextual elements are too poor for specifying a 
determined content. Formalists may resort to this situation in order to reinforce their 
position. But Walton’s proposal offers a way out for non-formalists. Listeners may 
determine musical meaning imaginatively, even when it is not specified and 
activated by contextual use. For, especially if they have some previous experiential 
knowledge of the kind of music they are hearing, they are prompted by the structural 
features of the heard sounds and dynamic sound relations to imagine the details of 
the ideas they generally connote. Due to music temporal development, listeners build 
narratives by means of which they understand musical dynamic structures and their 
expressive features, for example interpreting them through concepts such as 
“struggle”, “triumph”, etc. (see also SLOBODA 1985). In this way, listeners imagine 
characters, situations, events that fill the general concepts exemplified by the musical 
features perceived while hearing. So, one way for grasping musical meaning is to 
assign music a sense, a direction, through the imaginative “filling” of the musical 
“abstract” structures. These interpretations put meaning into action (cf. KRAMER 
2001: 7). Surely, also due to their specific cultural backgrounds, different listeners 
probably determine the floating meaning of music in different ways and, so, 
interpretative conflicts may arise; however, it is then possible to share the different 
interpretations inter-subjectively, discussing their validity, relevance and pertinence, 
as it happens regarding any work of art. 
d) This is the specific job of a special kind of listeners: musical critics. 
Resorting to sources of different kinds (composers’ statements, comparisons between 
musical works, cultural connections, etc.), they make sense of the music, exploring 
its particular expressivity, discovering possible narratives, and offering guides for the 
listening. These guides are linguistic paraphrases of musical events. They are 
interpretations: (often written) speech acts that introduce music in cultural 
discourses, generating (and showing) possible ways to grasp contents from music 
and to understand them. In so doing, they acquire the function of contextual 
elements, determining, in debatable ways, the floating musical meaning.  
e) Generally speaking, musical actualized meaning emerges as result of 
pragmatic acts of interpretation performed by different subjects (KRAMER 2001: 
71). However, in addition to the pragmatic-contextual specifications provided by 
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composers, performers and listeners, meaning is also generated intermedially, i.e. 
through the combination of music with different media, especially images and words. 
It is not only the case, as musical formalists seem to think (see KIVY 2002: 160-
201), that music gains meaning thanks to the combination with images and texts. 
Also images and texts receive meanings by their combination with music. This is 
another case of contextualization: through these combinations a context is provided 
in virtue of which meaning is creatively generated by musically qualifying texts and 
images and, viceversa, by visually and linguistically qualifying music. While 
expressively “coloring” the semantic and representational features of texts and 
images, the sonic qualities of music connote, and impact upon, them, and, 
reciprocally, the semantic and representational features of texts and images specify 
and determine the floating aboutness of music. You may for example think about 
how music can indicate how to interpret the moving images and the words of 
fictional and documentary movies as well of computer games.  
 
 
3. The Emergentist View of Musical Meaning 
 
3.1. Conversational Emergentism 
According to a pragmatic or contextualist view of linguistic meaning, the meaning of 
a sentence is determined through its use in, as well as its impact on, a specific 
context and/or in/on a specific practice. However, that the meaning of an utterance is 
determined through inference of speaker’s intentions from contextually valid 
conventions in reference to practices is only partially true. Practices and contexts are 
not to be conceived of exclusively in terms of unchanging codes to be applied for 
grasping specific meanings of utterances in reference to speakers’ intentions26. They 
are not fixed entities; they change as they are (trans-)formed by uses (including 
speech acts). Referring to practices we may understand specific meanings as uses of 
language; but precisely those uses constitute practices as such, while thereby (trans-
)forming them27.  
This amounts to saying: linguistic meaning emerges (in a potentially creative way) 
upon the use of language in practices which, in turn, are (trans-)formed by the uses 
of language. Meaning is not only the result of inferences from previous knowledge, 
but a (more or less) creative achievement28. It emerges from previous uses.29 Hence, 
                                                          
26 Anti-intentionalist and emergentist approaches to social interaction and communication are being 
developed in the embodied cognition research of social neurosciences. Cf. MORGANTI et al. 2008. 
27 I think that this is more or less the meaning of Wittgenstein’s claim «we make up the rule as we go 
along» (cf. WITTGENSTEIN 1953: § 83). In De Saussure’s terms, we may say that the «langue» (the 
linguistic code) lives through the «parole» (the utterance), but is also changed by the «parole», whose 
use it is not deducible by the «langue». (Cf. SAUSSURE 1916). 
28  Recanati is somehow going in this direction, when, interestingly applying a musical term to 
linguistic meaning, he claims that the understanding of meaning may require a creative modulation: 
«to determine a suitable sense for complex expressions, we need to go beyond the meaning of 
individual words and creatively enrich or otherwise adjust what we are given in virtue purely of 
linguistic meaning» (RECANATI 2004: 139). Those adjustments, considered along a large temporal 
scale, may explain also some transformations of language (cf. MITHEN 2005: 17-18). Tomasello’s 
sociopragmatics offers a scientific theoretical frame for explaining the creative inter-subjective 
development (and learning) of language (see TOMASELLO 2008). 
29 The notion of the «emergent» derives from Mead. He wrote: «The emergent when it appears is 
always found to follow from the past, but before it appears, it does not, by definition, follow from the 
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as Richard K. Sawyer maintains (SAWYER 2005), linguistic meaning is a matter of 
performance, not (only) of competence. Likewise, contextualism is a theory of 
meaning generation, accounting for the dynamic inter-relation between practices and 
meanings. Meaning is understood not only because speakers and hearers know how 
to apply linguistic tools and rules, but also because they act through language, (trans-
)forming linguistic tools and rules. 
In a sense, the use of language is always conversational and dialogic. Linguistic 
meaning does not only depend from acknowledging speakers’ intentions, by means 
of connecting the utterance to the context of use through pragmatic implicatures (as 
proposed by GRICE 1975, cf. LEVINSON 1983, BIANCHI 2006): the meaning of 
an utterance is rather generated through communicational interactions. That what 
generates meaning is not the speaker’s intention, but the intention grasped, 
processed, interpreted, and (trans-)formed by receivers according to the way they 
appropriate, and in this way (trans-)form, social and linguistic practices. To put it 
bluntly, meaning emerges through social and linguistic interactions.  
Following Sawyer, this view may be called emergentism. As the development of 
conversations exemplarily shows, its point is this: on the one hand, denotational 
reference depends on pragmatic presuppositions (such as indexical entailment, 
speakers’ roles, conversational maxims, topic structure, and speech style), but, on the 
other hand, participants to linguistic interactions may transform the presuppositions 
in virtue of the impact of their speech acts on the normativity of the linguistic 
interaction.  
In other words, the whole meaning of linguistic interactions such as conversations is 
generated autopoietically through the interaction itself30: it emerges from it. As 
Sawyer claims, 
 
a conversation is collectively created and emerges from the actions of everyone 
present. In every conversation, we negotiate all of the properties of the 
encounter – where the conversation will go, what kind of conversation we’re 
having, what our social relationship is, when it will end (SAWYER 2001: 19, 
SAWYER 2003: 108). 
 
While denotational values are presupposed as well as generated pragmatically in 
reference to the contexts, the development of the conversation may change them 
creatively in retrospect. The semantic context is continuously shifting thanks to 
pragmatic factors, because words receptive interpretation and active generation of 
meaning are coincident. The sense of speaker A’s utterance is shaped, retroactively, 
through speaker B’s answer: the way B answers to what A said is an interpretation 
of the meaning of what A said, that (trans-)forms it. To sum up: meanings of speech 
acts emerge through speakers’ linguistic interactions. 
 
3.2. Musical Emergent Meaning 
This, I contend, happens also in musical interactions. A musical piece gets its 
meaning not only in virtue of, say, expressive features at the level of the 
composition, but as a consequence of listeners’ emotional responses, mediated by 
                                                                                                                                                                    
past» (MEAD 1932: 2). 
30 The term «autopoiesis» means “self-creation” and has been firstly used for labeling the process by 
means of which living systems reproduce themselves: they generate their own components that, 
recursively, are involved in the production of the system (Cf. MATURANA, VARELA 1980).  
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performers’ interpretations as well as by musical criticism and by the context of the 
performance. Musical actualized meaning is the results of social negotiations that 
determine the potential, floating meaning of sound structures. It is not arbitrary, but 
emergent from the interactions between the composition (both as sound structure and 
as cultural construction), the interpretative performance (as expressive rendition and 
as communicational act) and the cultural context of the performance (including 
intermedial associations and musical criticism). As Nicholas Cook writes: 
 
As constructed in performance, then, meaning is emergent: it is not reproduced 
in but created through the act of the performance. […] For […] the material 
traces of music support a range of possible meanings, and […] they can be 
thought of as bundles comprised of an indefinite number of attributes from 
which different selections will be made within different cultural traditions, or on 
different occasions of interpretations (COOK 2001: 179). 
 
Against the formalist claim that pure, instrumental music (Kivy’s “music alone”) has 
no meaning, drawing on pragmatics it can be argued that music is never alone. The 
same way linguistic meaning is always contextual, Cook continues, music 
 
[…] is always received in a discursive context, and [it] is through the interaction 
of music and interpreter, text and context, that meaning is constructed, as a 
result of which the meaning attributed to any given material trace [for example 
a sound structure] will vary according to the circumstances of its reception. In 
this way it is wrong to speak of music having particular meanings; rather it has 
the potential for specific meanings to emerge under specific circumstances.  
 
[I]n terms of the semiotic process, musical works are to be understood as 
bundles or collocations of attributes that may be variously selected, combined, 
and incorporated within any given actualization of the music’s meaning. In 
other words, regarded as agents of meaning, musical works are unstable 
aggregates of potential signification (Ivi: 180, 188). 
 
To recap: the potential of sound structures to sonically exemplify dynamic relations, 
emotions, gestures, and actions is responsible for the generation of indefinite, 
floating abstract musical meanings. Its contextual interpretations (including semantic 
associations established at the compositional level, for example by adding a narrative 
program) transform this «potential meaning» into «actualized meaning» (Ivi: 186). In 
this sense musical meaning emerges from, and is continuously (trans-)formed by, the 
context of musical interactions. Therefore, the «literal meaning» of a composition 
may be not only intentionally (trans-)formed, pragmatically, through its use by a 
performer (cf. LONDON 2008); more radically, the actualized meaning is 
determined and emerges performatively, as the music is performed and interpreted. 
So musical meaning emerges as the result of a conversational interaction between 
composers, performers, receivers, critics and contextual multimediatic factors. As 
such, the understanding of musical meaning does not depend on grasping composers’ 
(and performers’) intentions, but on the performative interaction in the context where 
music is experienced.  
This idea may be articulated generally, in reference to artworks interpretation (cf. § 
3.3.), and specifically, in reference to improvisation (cf. § 3.4.). Before concluding 
the paper, I will briefly discuss these points. 
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3.3. Conversational Emergentism in Artworks Interpretation 
At the general level, and as a follow-up of the anti-formalist view of music as a 
meaningful art (cf. § 1.2.), it may be observed that the interpretation of musical 
meaning is a special case of the interpretation of artworks. As Noël Carroll argued in 
one of his most discussed papers, the interpretation of artworks may be conceived of 
in terms of a conversation between the receiver and the artist. In particular Carroll 
suggested that: 
 
When we read a literary text or contemplate a painting, we enter a relationship 
with its creator that is roughly analogous to a conversation. Obviously, it is not 
as interactive as an ordinary conversation, for we are not receiving spontaneous 
feedback concerning our own responses. But just as an ordinary conversation 
gives us a stake in understanding our interlocutor, so does interaction with an 
artwork (CARROLL 1992: 117). 
 
I think that Carroll is right in conceiving the interpretation of artworks as a kind of 
conversation. However, I do not endorse his conviction that the conversation is 
fulfilled, that is, the artwork’s meaning is understood, only when interpreters grasp 
artist’s intentions. For, as Andrew Huddleston has rightly observed (HUDDLESTON 
2012), the idea that interpretation of artworks are like conversational interactions is 
right, but Carroll’s Gricean intentionalism does not fit with “conversationalism”. 
Intentionalism seems to justify a monologic view of art interpretation rather than a 
conversational one. Conversations are indeed not directed at grasping speakers’ 
intentions, but require mutuality and proceeding besides initial artists’ intentions. 
Conversational meaning ensues in an emergent way, through interactional 
communication between speakers. Hence, if we accept the idea that a (kind of) 
conversation takes place between artworks and interpreters, we have to understand 
differently the way the meaning of the artwork results from the conversational 
interaction: it is not product of artist’s intentions (which actually are a private affair), 
but emerges through negotiations occurring within the receptional context, where the 
conversational interaction really takes place: it is the outcome of the way the 
message is understood and used in the interpretational context(s). This implies that 
the context of reception pragmatically enriches and (trans-)forms the artwork’s 
meaning. Since interpretations are not only manifestations, but productive (trans-
)formations of meanings, not only authors, artists, and composers, but also 
performers, readers, viewers, and listeners contribute to the artwork’s meaning31. So, 
if the relation to an artwork is like a conversation, the artwork’s meaning emerges, 
and is transformed, through each act of interpretation.  
What holds in general for art, is true also for music: as we saw, musical meaning is 
not static and fixed, but changes dynamically through each performing, listening, and 
interpreting act in pragmatic relation to the particular context in which it happens. 
Performing arts, like music, are particularly interesting cases, at this regard, because 
here interpretations are offered not only by receivers (and critics), but also by 
performers, who interact conversationally with the piece they play.  
 
 
                                                          
31 This view has a Gadamerian “flavor”, since Gadamer famously conceived of interpretation of 
artworks (and other texts) as a dialogue between artwork and interpreters, defending that the artwork’s 
meaning is (trans-)formed through its Wirkungsgeschichte, i.e. through its interpretations (see 
GADAMER 1960: 162-384).  
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3.4. Emergentism in improvisational interactions 
As I argued, musical meaning is generated pragmatically, in virtue of interpretations 
and uses that performatively signify on the compositions played. A special case is 
improvisation. While performing standard jazz, for instance, improvising performers 
interact conversationally with the piece on which they improvise, but, at the same 
time, they interact conversationally with each other. The musical meaning of the 
performance emerges through all those kinds of conversational interactions. This 
deserves attention, since artistic and, in particular, improvisational interactions are 
paradigmatic for the idea that musical meaning emerges in a  pragmatic, interactive, 
and conversational way. 
The point is that the activity of meaning generation and communication in a 
linguistic interaction such as a conversation is structurally analogous to what 
happens in a musical improvisational interaction. Moreover, both activities 
exemplify in the here and now of their occurrences the interactive generation, 
transformation, and circulation of linguistic and musical meaning on a larger 
temporal (historical) scale. As several musicians report (see BERLINER 1994), the 
musical interaction between improvisers is a kind of reciprocal communication. 
Especially improvisational music practices like jazz are dominated by the 
«phenomenology of musical conversation» (KRAUT 2005: 13), because the musical 
interaction between improvisers is a kind of conversation, it has a dialogic character.  
Reciprocally, conversations are collective improvisations (see SAWYER 2001, 
SAWYER 2003). Many properties of a conversation (social relationships, 
conversational paths, the ends and the kind of the conversation, etc.) are negotiated 
pragmatically during the conversation itself, so that the development of a 
conversation is of an autopoietic kind: the determined meaning of utterances is 
established through the communicational interactions. This is exactly what happens 
in an improvisation. 
As in a conversation, the elements of a musical improvisation are not simply 
introduced in a well defined and pre-constituted frame in virtue of which they get 
significance in virtue of pragmatic or indexical presupposition, i.e. accordingly to 
already established contextual conventions of sign uses (like cultural rules of 
harmonic and rhythmic relations), remaining unchanged after their introduction. 
Rather, the sounds performed re-define (at least potentially) the frame they enter in 
in virtue of indexical entailment. That means: the use of signs creatively changes the 
context.32  Improvised musical elements acquire a certain (functional, expressive, 
connotational…) meaning thanks to contextual implicatures; but, once introduced as 
elements of the performance, they become parts of the evolving context, contributing 
to re-organizing it in virtue of indexical entailment. Hence, the context of the 
performance is an open and self-transforming system: it emerges dynamically and 
retroactively out of (relations between) unforeseen contingencies which feedback the 
system (cf. BERTINETTO 2016a: 263-276, NATOLI 2011, GAGEL 2004: 20). 
Like speakers in a conversation, improvisers are constrained by the specific 
performance situation to which they have to adapt and are guided by referents 
(conceptual, cultural, social, technical, formal, and stylistic habits, conventions, and 
constraints), in virtue of which they shape expectations about the development of the 
                                                          
32 For the relation between indexical presupposition and indexical entailment see SILVERSTEIN 
2003. SAWYER 1996 applied it to improvisational interaction. 
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performance and understand (more or less) what is going on33. Thereby they are able 
to evaluate what they themselves and their fellow performers are doing. Moreover, 
like in speech, while musically interacting with each other, improvisers follow 
something like the Gricean conversational implicatures and cooperative maxims. 
Yet, again like speakers in a conversation, they also may intervene on the contextual 
constraints: the referential frame, that guides performers’ and audience expectations 
and sets norms for the musical meaning of what is happening, is not stable and static. 
It is rather dynamic and changes (or may change) during the performance: in fact it 
emerges during the performance beyond performers’ subjective intentions (see 
SAWYER 2001: 41-43, BERTRAM 2010). Sawyer explains: 
 
Using Mead’s notion of the emergent, we can characterize the process of 
improvisational creativity as follows. Performers are constrained to operate 
within the performance genre. A given act is more narrowly constrained by the 
emergent. The nature of this constraint is unique and specific to the 
performance and the moment of interaction. In improvisational genres, each 
performer is expected to contribute something original to the evolving emergent 
in each act, through the process of indexical entailment. In the choice of 
indexical entailment, performers are subject to the constraints of the emergent. 
In response to the performer's action, the other participants evaluate the act, and 
the subsequent interaction determines to what extent the indexical entailment 
resulting from the act affects the (still/always evolving) emergent. This 
‘evaluation’ is often immediate and often not consciously goal-directed. A more 
skillful indexical entailment is more likely to enter the emergent, thus operating 
with more force on subsequent performance acts. 
Thus, we have a continuing process: a performer, constrained by the 
collectively created emergent, originates an action with some indexical 
entailment; the interlocutors, through their responses in subsequent actions, 
collectively determine the extent to which this act enters the emergent; the new 
emergent then similarly constrains the subsequent performers. Throughout, the 
‘meta-constraint’ of genre definition controls many properties of this 
interactional process: how much indexical entailment is considered acceptable, 
how performer's acts are allocated, how performers create acts which retain 
coherence with the emergent (SAWYER 1996: 279-280). 
 
Therefore, value and meaning of every single piece of the whole performance is not 
definitive and fixed before the process, but depends upon the self-developing 
network of references. It is floating, because the referential context of the 
performance is continuously re-created during its generation. Every performance act 
acquires its meaning and, reciprocally, contributes creatively to the meaning of the 
whole process, in the course of the performance34. Reciprocally, the meaning of the 
elements of the performance is established holistically through the performance 
itself. This means: the sense of the whole process emerges autopoietically through 
the whole process35. 
                                                          
33  Cf. PRESSING 1984,1998, GRATIER 2008. For further cognitivist investigation on the 
improvisational process see JOHNSON-LAIRD 2002; BERKOWITZ 2010.  
34 As I elaborated elsewhere, the meaning-generating role of “mistakes” is particularly important at 
this regard (BERTINETTO 2016b), in that in a musical improvisation, unexpected events that violate 
stylistic constraints and expectations may turn out to be source of musical creativity. Cf. WALTON et 
al. 2014. 
35 For a cognitivist account of the autopoietic dimension of improvisational interaction see WALTON 
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Again, this is like what happens in a conversation. Improvisers understand the 
meaning of a musical gesture not simply by recognizing the intentions of a fellow 
player, but when they are able to respond to that gesture in the right manner. Yet, the 
rightness of the response will be proved by further replies, the same way in 
conversations the determined meaning of what is said does not depend (exclusively) 
from the intentions of the speakers, but (also) from the general development of the 
interaction, contextual implicatures, social constraints, etc.36  
Conversations are pragmatic uses of languages. They are interactions in which 
communication is generated. As we have seen, musical meaning is generated 
communicatively through different musical actions. A composer communicates for 
instance by means of producing a notation that must be interpreted by performers 
relying on the conventions of musical practices and providing contextual information 
for determining the musical meaning. Performers communicate by means of 
interpreting a musical score, by means of signifying on a given piece, and by means 
of using the composition for communicating own messages in virtue of pragmatic 
and contextual implicatures.  
Yet, the interplay of collective improvisation is particularly apt to show the 
interactive, conversational dimension of musical communication and the emergentist 
nature of musical meaning37. Interactive improvisation exemplifies in the moment of 
the generation of music the pragmatic production of musical meaning and, in 
particular, the performative power of interpretation that actualizes and determines 
potential and floating musical meanings. Improvisations are real performative, 
conversational interactions in which performers’ actions depend on (culturally 
grounded) expectations of what other agents will probably do and are, at the same 
time, interdependent from other agents’ actual actions that may confirm or violate 
previous expectations, thereby generating unexpected and unforeseeable outcomes. 
Consequently, the meaning of each musical gesture is not only determined by the 
current cultural implicatures of a practice, but emerges on the musical interaction in 
virtue of “conversational” implicatures generated in and by the specific performance. 
The way improvisers B, C, etc. reacts to the sounds generated by A impinges on their 
significance, since the outcome of A’s musical actions is conditioned by musical 
actions performed by of B, C, etc. (LEWIS 2002: 8) 38 . To put it bluntly, in 
improvisation musical meaning is performatively generated through the interactive 
music making: meaning circulates and is emergently (trans-)formed through 
performative interactions between performers in relation to the particular situation of 
the performance.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
et al. 2014.  
36  Cf. SAWYER 1996: 10: «Each performance act is subject to a variety of interactional forces: (1) 
the performer of the act, who contributes something new to the flow of interaction through indexical 
entailment; (2) the other participants in interaction; (3) the definition/constraints of the performance 
genre; (4) the independent regimenting force operating on the act which derives from the flow of the 
prior interaction, and constitutes the indexical presuppositions of the act  […]». 
37 By the way, the autopoietic normativity of improvisation, in which each act gets its meaning 
through the interpretive reactions of others acts, and which, therefore, is structurally similar to the 
development of conversations, may be taken as paradigm of art interpretation (see BERTRAM 2014), 
and this confirms the force of the conversational, but anti-intentionalist, view of art interpretation 
discussed above (§ 3.3.).  
38 For example a musical phrase played by the pianist may afford the answer of the drummer, that 
performatively gives it a certain sense; the saxophonist may differently react to the previous 
interaction, thereby (trans)-forming again its significance. 
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So, the way improvising performers coordinate with each others, thereby developing 
a shared intentionality, is analogous to processes of linguistic conversation 
pragmatics, although their phenomenology may differ39, and although the meaning 
emerging from the improvising interaction is rather of an exemplificational, not of a 
referential, sort, in that, providing sonic images of exercises of interactive 
communicational abilities, it is a structural analogous of the process of meaning 
emergence in a conversation. 
Nonetheless, as I have previously maintained, there are different kinds of musical 
actions: in particular, (1) actions and gestures suggested by music which embodies 
personal traits generating virtual communicational interactions (§ 1.2.); (2) 
communicational actions accomplished by persons (composers, performers, 
listeners…) through or with music (§ 2.2.). In musical improvisation both kinds of 
action may coincide. The dynamic gestures iconically embodied by musical sounds 
may express real communicational interactions between performers, besides a mere 
structural analogy. So, the social interactive dynamics occurring in a group 
improvisation support the idea that music making is used for communicating and 
generating social relationships and that we listen to music as embodying and 
expressing communicational interactions between (imaginary or real) agents. 
This, in turn, reinforces the analogy between music and language, providing a way to 
defend, against the formalist challenge, the plausibility of musical meaning recurring 
to a sound pragmatic and emergentist account.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper I have proposed a pragmatic and emergentist account of musical 
meaning. Music presents sonic images of dynamic relations and induces movements 
in hearers, expressing and arousing emotions, and embodying personal traits. 
Therefore it possesses a connotational, potential, and floating meaning which is 
determined and activated by the way music is used, in virtue of pragmatic 
connections, contextual references, as well as cultural and intermedial associations. 
In particular, meaning emerges through conversational interactions between different 
agents: persons (composers, performers, listeners, and critics), other media (images 
and texts), cultural objects (like musical works), and contexts (of compositions and, 
especially, of performances). 
In musical improvisation all these agents may collaborate for producing music and 
musical meaning. Here, performers are, at the same time, composers that interact 
interpretatively with each others, with the performing situation, with musical 
practices, and, possibly, with an extant composition, upon which they improvise. In 
this sense, improvisation is like a conversation: between performers, with the 
performing context and the audience, with a musical practice and, possibly, with a 
                                                          
39 Modalities for showing consent or dissent musically are for example different from the ways we 
show agreement or disagreement in speech. In speech, «one is expected to give floor when agreeing 
and take the floor when contradicting», while in an experiment turned out that in musical 
improvisational interaction «sustained playing together with the interlocutor was a typical feature of 
affiliatory behaviours, and well-segregated turn-taking [seems to be] associated with disdain […]. In 
addition, interacting musicians systematically manipulated the complementary or contrasting 
character of their synchronous signaling to suggest e.g. an initial conflict being resolved in a 
conciliatory manner […]. On the contrary, in speech, one does not signal affiliation by ‘talking’ 
simultaneously over one’s conversation partner, a major third apart» (AUCOUTURIER, CANONNE 
2017: 106). 
RIFL (2017) Vol. 11, n. 2: 1-29 
DOI: 10.4396/20171201I4 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
22 
composition. Musical meaning, like the meaning generated through artworks’ 
conversational interpretations, emerges through all those conversational interactions. 
Musical improvisation offers a view into the pragmatic (conversational and 
emergentist) generation of musical meaning; it portraits the way meaning emerges 
through and from communicative ‘musical speech acts’ performed by musicians as 
well by listeners. So, it reinforces the idea that music, like language, can also be 
understood in terms of communicative (inter)actions, thereby supporting, against the 
formalistic (mis-)understanding of music, the idea of musical meaning as well as the 
plausibility of the venerable metaphor of music as language.  
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